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The norm of assertion: a 
‘constitutive’ rule? 
Neri Marsili 
University of Barcelona (Logos Research Group) 1 
Abstract: According to an influential hypothesis, the speech act of 
assertion is subject to a single ‘constitutive’ rule, that takes the form: 
“One must: assert that p only if p has C”. Scholars working on 
assertion interpret the assumption that this rule is ‘constitutive’ in 
different ways. This disagreement, often unacknowledged, threatens 
the foundations of the philosophical debate on assertion. This paper 
reviews different interpretations of the claim that assertion is 
governed by a constitutive rule. It argues that once we understand 
the full import of assuming that assertion is governed by a 
constitutive rule, it becomes clear that some fundamental 
assumptions of the current debate are mistaken, and others 
unwarranted.  
1. Williamson’s hypothesis
What is the norm 2  of assertion? Timothy Williamson’s “Assertion” (1996, 
revised in 2000) has sparked a lively philosophical debate over this question. 
The debate originated from a simple hypothesis (Williamson 2000:241):  
WILLIAMSON’S HYPOTHESIS 
What are the rules of assertion? An attractively simple suggestion is this. 
There is just one [constitutive] rule. Where C is a property of propositions, 
the rule says: 
(The C-rule) • One must: assert p only if p has C. 
1 The author would like to thank Jennifer Saul, Paul Faulkner, Ivan Milić and Manuel 
García-Carpintero for helpful comments on earlier drafts. 




WILLIAMSON’S HYPOTHESIS is that there is a single rule regulating every act of 
assertion, requiring the asserted proposition to have a particular property C. 
This rule is the unique norm that is constitutive of assertion, and it individuates 
this speech act (it sets assertions apart from other speech acts). To specify the 
norm of assertion, one needs to identify property C. This raises the question 
that animates the debate: which property is C? 
Williamson’s answer is that C is the property of being known by the 
assertor. In other words, assertion is governed by the norm that one should not 
assert what one does not know to be true: 
 
WILLIAMSON’S ANSWER: THE KNOWLEDGE-RULE 
KR: “You must: assert that p only if you know that p”. 
 
A number of philosophers have found KR a convincing answer (e.g. DeRose 
2002; Hawthorne 2004; Benton 2011). However, the debate is far from settled, 
and Williamson’s position has elicited a number of critical responses. One could 
roughly divide these critical reactions into two categories. 
The first comprises those who accept Williamson’s hypothesis, but refuse 
Williamson’s answer in favour of a different one, i.e. an alternative account of 
what property C is. For instance, some maintain that a warranted assertion 
requires instead the truth of the proposition (Weiner 2005, Whiting 2012), or 
some relevant reason to believe it (Douven 2006, Lackey 2007, Kvanvig 2009, 
Marsili 2018). 
The second category comprises those who reject or challenge Williamson’s 
hypothesis, either in part or as a whole. Some philosophers (Brown 2008, Carter 
2015, Carter & Gordon 2011, Gerken 2014, Marsili 2015, McKenna 2015) reject 
the assumption that there is only one norm of assertion. Others have argued 
that assertion is not constituted by a rule of this kind (Hindriks 2007, Maitra 
2011, McCammon 2014:137-9, Marsili 2015:120-1, Black 2018; cf. also Pagin 
2016, Kelp & Simion 2018), sometimes even going so far as to claim that there 
is no such thing as an ‘assertion-game’ to which the putative rule applies 
(Cappelen 2011). 
In this paper, I put forward a criticism that belongs to the second category. 
After showing that Williamson’s notion of ‘constitutive rule’ departs 
significantly from the orthodox understanding of what a constitutive rule is, I 
examine the extent and consequences of this departure. I argue that the revised 
notion of “constitutive rule” is open to slightly different interpretations, and 
that different authors writing on the norm of assertion problematically adopt 
different ones. After considering some competing ways to make sense of the 
claim that norm is constitutive, I show that no coherent interpretation is 








2. The orthodox account of constitutive norms 
 
Williamson claims that the norm of assertion is a constitutive rule: “[My] paper 
aims to identify the constitutive rule(s) of assertion, conceived by analogy with 
the rules of a game. [...] Henceforth, ‘rule’ will mean constitutive rule” (1996:489-
90). The notion of ‘constitutive rule’ is widely employed across a range of 
different philosophical subjects, “as diverse as philosophy of language, 
philosophy of law, and most recently artificial intelligence” (Hindriks 2009:254), 
and is especially central in speech act theory and social ontology. Authors 
employing this notion rarely call into question the orthodox account: an 
influential account of norms that was developed by Searle (1964, 1969, 1995) 
as a refinement of previous accounts3, which progressively became the received 
view in these disciplines. In this section, I will cover the orthodox account; in 
the next one, I will move on to Williamson’s. 
On the orthodox view, constitutive rules are defined in opposition to 
regulative rules. Regulative rules track our ordinary understanding of what a 
rule is: an imperative that serves as a “guide, or as a maxim, or as a 
generalization from experience” (Rawls 1956:24). These rules can be violated (it 
is possible to disobey the rule), but transgressors are prima facie susceptible to 
criticism (or sanctions) for violating the rule. Given their directive function, 
regulative rules “characteristically have the form or can be comfortably 
paraphrased [as imperatives] of the form ‘Do X’ or ‘If Y do X’” (Searle 1969:33). 
For instance, “Do not chew with your mouth open”, or “if the traffic light turns 
red, vehicles must stop”. 
Constitutive rules differ from regulative rules in several ways. A first 
distinctive difference is that they are more like definitions than commands. This 
is because they do not set obligations; rather, they define what it is to engage 
in a particular institutional practice: 
 
Regulative rules regulate antecedently or independently existing forms 
of behaviour [...]. But constitutive rules do not merely regulate, they 
                                               
3 The distinction was first introduced by Polish philosopher Czesław Znamierowski 
(1921), who contrasts “coercive norms” (normy koercytywne, corresponding to regulative 
rules) with “constructive norms” (normy konstrukcyjne, corresponding to constitutive 
ones). Other precursors include Reinach (1987), Midgley (1949), Mabbott (1953), and 





create or define new forms of behaviour. The rules of football or 
chess, for example [...] create the very possibility of playing such 
games. Searle (1969:33) 
  
Constitutive rules can be phrased as ‘count-as’ locutions: “X counts as Y-
ing in C” (1969:33). For instance, the constitutive rule of ‘checkmating’ can be 
expressed as follows: “attacking the king in such a way that no move will leave 
it unattacked counts as checkmate in the game of chess”. The ‘definitional’ 
(rather than imperative) character of constitutive rules reflects their 
‘performative’ function: they establish institutional practices by defining them 
(Searle 1995). 
A consequence of the non-imperative character of constitutive rules is that 
while regulative rules can be disobeyed, constitutive rules cannot: “it is not easy 
to see how one could even violate the rule as to what constitutes checkmate in 
chess, or a [goal] in football” (Searle 1969: 41). To fail to comply with a 
constitutive rule is simply to fail to engage in the activity subject to that rule: 
for instance, checkmating the opponent ‘incorrectly’ simply amounts to a failure 
to checkmate. 
To sum up (see table below), the orthodox account claims that: (1) 
constitutive rules establish the practices they regulate, while regulative rules 
regulate pre-existing practices; (2) given their nature, constitutive rules cannot 
be violated, while regulative rules can; (3) constitutive rules can be easily 
formulated as count-as locutions, while regulative rules generally take the form 
of imperatives.  
 
# CONSTITUTIVE RULES # REGULATIVE RULES 
C1 Establish (define) the practices they regulate R1 Regulate pre-existing practices 
C2 Cannot be ‘properly’ violated R2 Can be violated 
C3 Typically take the form of ‘count-as’ locutions R3 Typically take the form of imperatives 
 
 
3. Williamson on constitutive norms 
 
In presenting his account of constitutive rules, Williamson significantly departs 
from the orthodox understanding of constitutive rules: his analysis clashes with 
(C2) and (C3) 4. Since this difference is rarely acknowledged in the literature, 
                                               
4 Note that the aim of this paper is to highlight differences between Williamson’s 





it is worth pointing out that Williamson himself fails to mention it: on the 
contrary, he presents the proposed interpretation as uncontroversial (“we have 
at least a crude conception of constitutive rules...” 2000: 239) and in line with 
the tradition. 
Williamson refuses to commit himself to a particular definition of 
constitutive rules by stating that he will make “no attempt […] to define ‘rule’” 
(2000: 239). Nevertheless, he gives a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
being a constitutive rule: “A rule will count as constitutive of an act only if it 
is essential to that act: necessarily, the rule governs every performance of the 
act” (2000:239). 
A core tenet of this view is that, if a rule is constitutive of an act, it is 
essential to it. Being ‘essential to’ an act, in turn, means that the rule 
necessarily governs that act (rather than contingently). The claim here is that 
the speech act of assertion could not have been governed by another norm, and 
it could not exist if the C-rule was not in place (cf. Pagin 2015: §6.2, 2016:184-
5). This comes close to condition (C1) of the orthodox characterisation of 
constitutive rules: under both conceptions, constitutive rules are essential to 
the practices that they regulate. 
Williamson’s conception of constitutive rules, however, departs from 
orthodoxy with respect to (C1) and (C3). Against (C3), he maintains that 
constitutive rules typically take an imperative form: in other words, he takes 
them to possess the regulative property (R3) rather than the constitutive 
property (C3) (cf. Maitra 2011: 280-4, Hindriks 2007: 396). He argues that 
constitutive rules characteristically put an agent under an obligation: “‘must’ 
expresses the kind of obligation characteristic of constitutive rules”. He phrases 
the C-rule in an imperative form: “In the imperative, assert p only if p has C” 
(2000: 241). 
Against (C2), Wiliamson claims that constitutive rules “do not lay down 
necessary conditions for performing the constituted act”. Consequently, 
satisfying the constitutive rule of assertion is not necessary for asserting: “when 
one breaks a rule of assertion, one does not thereby fail to make an assertion” 
(2000: 240). More generally, one can φ without satisfying the constitutive rule 
of φ-ing. Hence, failing to satisfy the rule involves being liable to criticism, 
rather than not asserting. By contrast, on the orthodox view an infraction of a 
                                               
My critical discussion of Williamson’s position should not be taken to imply that the 
orthodox view is free of error. Objections to the orthodox framework have been 
presented by Ransdell (1971), Schwyzer (1969), Cherry (1973), Garcia (1987), Ruben 
(1997) and Hindriks (2009). Even though I am sympathetic to Hindrik’s (2009) 
proposed refinement of the regulative/constitutive distinction, for the purpose of this 
paper (which is, again, to contrast Williamson’s view with the orthodox one) I will 




constitutive rule amounts to not φ-ing, rather than φ-ing inappropriately. 
Again, the proposed view is rather in line with the corresponding regulative 
property (R2). 
Williamson’s departure from the orthodox conception raises some serious 
interpretative concerns with respect to the abundant literature on the norm of 
assertion. On the one hand, Williamson attributes characteristically regulative 
properties (R2, R3) to the C-rule instead of the corresponding constitutive 
properties (C2, C3), so that the rule is not taken to be constitutive in the 
traditional sense (as pointed out by Hindriks 2007:396, McCammon 2014:137-
9, cf. also Maitra 2011). On the other hand, several authors take the C-rule to 
stand out as the constitutive norm of assertion, in the customary sense (e.g. 
García-Carpintero 2004:143, 2018:4, Rescorla 2007:253, 2009:99, Turri 
2013:281). 
It would be wrong to dismiss this as a mere verbal dispute, where authors 
simply disagree on how to use the term ‘constitutive’. On the one hand, there 
is no acknowledged disagreement – very few authors seem to have noticed that 
the term is used in radically different ways (Hindriks 2007:396, McCammon 
2014:137-9, Kauppinen 2018:12fn are exceptions). On the other hand (and more 
importantly), the underlying disagreement is not merely verbal: different 
understandings of what the term ‘constitutive’ means result in incompatible 
understandings of what WILLIAMSON’S HYPOTHESIS is about. To wit, if the C-
rule constitutes assertion in the orthodox sense, it cannot be violated while still 
asserting; but if it regulates assertion in Williamson’s sense, it can be violated 
while still asserting. Rather than explicitly disagreeing about how the term 
‘constitutive’ should be used, philosophers are endorsing incompatible 
interpretations of WILLIAMSON’S HYPOTHESIS, without acknowledging that 
these interpretations are incompatible. And this threatens to undermine the 
foundations of the philosophical debate on the norm of assertion: if there is no 
consensus about what ‘constitutive’ means, different authors can (and do) mean 
different things when they write about the ‘constitutive’ norm of assertion, 
effectively talking past each other.  
This paper aims to bring clarity back into the debate. But solving this 
disagreement is not as simple as reaffirming what I have already stated, namely 
that Williamson interprets the notion in a novel way, as possessing properties 
(C1*, R2, R3). In the course of this essay, I will show that this solution is also 
problematic, because it renders the claim that the norm of assertion is 
‘constitutive’ of little or no significance. Before entering the details of the pros 
and cons of each account, however, I want to introduce in more detail both 
proposed interpretations. 
In the next section, I will interpret the C-rule as an orthodoxly constitutive 




a regulative rule that possesses the constitutive feature (C1*) instead of (R1). 
Both attempts will prove problematic and incompatible with the desiderata 
underlying WILLIAMSON’S HYPOTHESIS. I will conclude that the problem rather 
lies in the HYPOTHESIS: while assertion is arguably subject to a norm taking the 
form of the C-rule, this norm is not constitutive of assertion in any sense that 
is meaningful for the debate (§5).  
 
 
4. The C-Rule as a Constitutive Rule 
 
4.1. Phrasing the C-rule as orthodoxly constitutive 
 
A first strategy to make sense of the claim that the norm is ‘constitutive’ is to 
interpret the C-rule as a constitutive rule, on the orthodox understanding 
(García-Carpintero 2004:143, 2018:4, Rescorla 2007:253, 2009:99, Turri 
2013:281, cf. also Maitra 2011: 283-4, Goldberg 2015:§1). Can we show that 
there is a sense in which this interpretation is compatible with WILLIAMSON’S 
HYPOTHESIS? The first difficulty is that, according to the HYPOTHESIS, the C-
rule rather takes a regulative form: 
 
(A1) One must: assert that p only if p has C 
 
To treat (A1) as a constitutive norm, perhaps we could rewrite it as follows:  
 
(A1*) One asserts that p only if p has C 
 
(A1*) satisfies (C1), (C2), and (C3), so that it is a constitutive reading of (A1).  
However, (A1*) is clearly not a plausible rephrasing, at least not in a sense 
relevant for the debate. In fact, most authors want to claim that property C is 
a property like K: ‘being known by the speaker’, or B: ‘being believed by the 
speaker’. But if C=K, or C=B, then saying what you do not know, or what you 
do not believe, is not asserting – a possibility explicitly denied by Williamson 
(2000: 240, see also Koethe 2009:628).  
To turn (A1) into a constitutive norm, one needs a rephrasing that satisfies 
(C1), (C2) and (C3) and that acknowledges the existence of assertions without 





(A2) One asserts that p iff in asserting p, one is subject to the obligation 
that p must have C5 
 
This formulation satisfies our desiderata, but it contains a circular element, as 
assertion figures on both sides of the biconditional. To avoid this worry, the 
right leg of the biconditional can be rephrased so as to avoid any reference to 
assertions (see also Reiland 2019):  
 
(A3) One asserts that p iff in saying p, one is subject to the obligation that 
p must have C 
 
Now, (A3) differs significantly from the formulation (A1) originally found in 
Williamson, so that it represents a substantive amendment of his view. 
Nonetheless, there seem to be strong reasons to prefer this reading, as it appears 
to meet all the desiderata of the orthodox conception. Consistently with (C1), 
it defines the practice of assertion by declaring what it is to engage in that 
practice: it is to be subject to the obligation that what is said must have C. 
Consistently with (C2), it cannot be disobeyed: if one is not subject to the 
obligation that p has C, one is simply not asserting. And, consistently with 
(C3), it can be phrased as a count-as locution6. Moreover, it allows for the 
existence of assertions that do not have property C, thus avoiding the problem 
of (A1*). 
 
4.2 Treating two rules as one 
 
Despite its appeal, there is patently something wrong with the envisaged 
reconciliation between the orthodox view and Williamson’s: the orthodox 
                                               
5 This introduces the requirement that p be said; the purpose of this extra requirement 
to avoid that presuppositions and implicatures are counted as assertions (cf. Alston 
2007:24-5, Pagin 2015:§2.2). I use the biconditional ‘iff’ (in place of the conditional ‘only 
if’) to incorporate Williamson’s claim that the rule regulates only assertion, and thus 
individuates it. For a more orthodox phrasing involving a ‘count as’ locution, cf. 
footnote 8. Goldberg (2015:25) endorses a version of (A2) in which the definiendum is 
restricted to warranted assertions: the “constitutive rule tells us that something is […] 
a warranted assertion iff condition C is satisfied”. 
6 Here is a possible translation of (A3) (with reasonable approximation) into a count-
as locution: 
(A3’) Being subject to the obligation to that p must have C in virtue of saying 
p counts as asserting that p 





interpretation of ‘constitutive norm’ requires (C2) and (C3) to be satisfied, and 
this is inconsistent with Williamson’s understanding of the C-rule, that rejects 
(C2) and (C3) in favour of (R2) and (R3). No consistent conception of a rule 
can meet both requirements, because requirements (C2) and (R2), and (C3) 
and (R3), are mutually exclusive: (R2) allows for violations of the norm that 
are still assertions, while (C2) does not; (R3) takes the rule to be akin to an 
imperative, while (C3) does not. 
Here is a possible reply. Even if (A3) as a whole cannot be violated in 
asserting, there is a sense in which (A3) expresses an obligation that can be 
violated: (A3) states that a proposition should be asserted only if it has property 
C. It is then possible to state a proposition that does not possess property C 
while still asserting. This shows that (A3) possesses not only constitutive 
features (C1-3) as shown in the previous section, but also regulative features 
(R2-3) – meeting the requirements of both the orthodox and the Williamsonian 
notion of constitutive rules.  
Though appealing, this reply rests on a mistake in interpreting 
WILLIAMSON’S HYPOTHESIS (possibly a common one in the relevant literature): 
on this reading, two rules are treated as one. This is because (A3) is a rule 
about another rule: it is a constitutive rule that states that if you assert, you 
are subject to another rule, a regulative rule, (A1). To show this, (A3) can be 
paraphrased as: 
 
(A3*) One asserts that p iff in saying p, one is subject to rule (A1) 
 
Where (A1) is: 
 
(A1) One must: assert that p only if p has C 
 
It is now apparent that (A3) does not possess both regulative and 
constitutive properties. To claim that (A3) possesses both regulative and 
constitutive features is to conflate (A3)’s properties and (A1)’s properties. This 
is a mistake, as (A3) and (A1) are different rules with different properties. (A3) 
is a definition of assertion and cannot be violated, while (A1) is an imperative 
and can be violated; the former is a constitutive rule in the traditional sense, 
the latter is not. The regulative reading (A1) is the original formulation 
introduced by the WILLIAMSON’S HYPOTHESIS, and hence consistent with it. 
The ‘constitutive’ reading (A3), by contrast, is not compatible with 
WILLIAMSON’S HYPOTHESIS, as it does not allow for violations that are still 
assertions. Scholars who claim that the C-rule is constitutive in the orthodox 
sense are therefore mistaken, because they incorrectly take (A3) to be 




Importantly, saying that (A3) is not the C-rule mentioned in the 
HYPOTHESIS falls short of claiming that (A3) is false. Even if (A3) is not the 
C-rule of assertion, it is a plausible definition of assertion in terms of its rule – 
that is, the C-rule, (A1). This definitional reading is compatible with the 
HYPOTHESIS, and it illustrates one of Williamson’s claims: that assertions can 
be defined as all and only the sayings that are subject to the C-rule (Williamson 
2000:241, cf. also Goldberg 2015:25, Johnson 2018:52). Furthermore, (A3) 
entails that (A1) regulates assertion – so that there is still an important sense 
in which (A3) establishes that asserting p is proper only if p has C. But this is 
not yet to say that (A3) is the constitutive norm of assertion, as defined by 
WILLIAMSON’S HYPOTHESIS. This claim is simply incorrect: despite their 
important connections, (A3) and (A1) are not equivalent, and belong to 
different kinds of rules. In sum, there is an important difference between the 
norm of assertion identified by Williamson, (A1), and the definition of assertion 
in terms of its norm, (A3).  
Now that these distinctions are clear, in the next section I will review 
interpretations that construe the norm of assertion as an orthodoxly regulative 
rule possessing some salient ‘constitutive’ features. 
 
 
5. The C-Rule as a Regulative Rule 
  
In claiming that constitutive rules possess orthodoxly regulative properties (R2, 
R3), Williamson seems to treat constitutive rules as (orthodoxly) regulative. 
Hindriks (2007:396) draws the same conclusion from considerations similar to 
mine (cf. also Maitra 2011:28f, McCammon 2014:137-9, Kauppinen 2018:12fn): 
 
In spite of the fact that Williamson invokes the analogy with games, the 
knowledge rule cannot be a constitutive rule [...]. Constitutive rules 
specify (non-normative or descriptive) requirements an entity such as 
an action has to have in order to constitute another entity. [...] A 
related problem regarding the knowledge rule as a [...] constitutive rule 
is that [the rule] is a directive rather than (merely) a specification: it 
forbids assertions that do not express knowledge. Thus, instead of a 
constitutive rule, the knowledge rule is a regulative rule. 
 
Nevertheless, there are good reasons to resist the conclusion that the term 
‘constitutive rule’ is used to refer to a plainly regulative rule. First, it seems 
unreasonable to redefine the traditional notion of constitutive rule so that it is 
equivalent to its complementary notion, without even acknowledging this 




intention. Second, and relatedly, this interpretation diverges from how the 
majority of philosophers interpret the claim. Many authors either do not 
acknowledge that the norm is in fact orthodoxly regulative, or explicitly claim 
(Pagin 2015: §6.2, García-Carpintero 2004:143, 2018:4,13) that it is not. Rather 
than claiming that most authors are mistaken in their interpretation of the 
notion, it would be better to find an interpretation of the norm in the light of 
which it is possible to make sense of the existing debate.  
 
5.1 Pollock’s paradigm: ‘prescriptive’ constitutive rules  
 
A better prospect is to interpret the norm of assertion as a third kind of rule: a 
regulative rule that possesses some salient features of constitutive rules. After 
all, Williamson defines constitutive rules as possessing a feature (C1) of 
constitutive rules (revised as (C1*)) and features (R2, R3) of regulative rules. 
Pollock (1982) has explicitly argued in favour of extending the label of 
‘constitutive’ to those orthodoxly regulative rules that are essential to the 
practices they regulate. Pollock notes that these rules are such that “to eliminate 
[them] would be to profoundly alter the nature of games”, so that they belong 
to “the rules that constitute the nature of [those games]”, and hence “must be 
regarded as constitutive” (1982:212-213, italics mine). He consequently 
distinguishes two kinds of constitutive rules: orthodoxly constitutive rules (in 
his terminology, definitive rules), and regulative norms that necessarily regulate 
a practice (prescriptive rules). These two kinds of constitutive rules are opposed 
to merely regulative norms, which are not essential to the practices they 
regulate7.  To sum up Pollock’s view: 
 
• CONSTITUTIVE RULES: 
- DEFINITIVE RULES: C1, C2, C3  
 (equivalent to orthodoxly constitutive rules) 
- PRESCRIPTIVE RULES: C1*, R2, R3 
(equivalent to Williamson’s constitutive rules) 
• REGULATIVE RULES: R1, R2, R3       
(equivalent to orthodoxly regulative rules) 
 
A prescriptive rule, on this conception, is a rule in terms of which the relevant 
practice can be defined. This can help to make sense of the tension between the 
                                               
7 Alston (2000:254) also adopts a similar conception of rules: a “regulative rule can also 
qualify as a constitutive rule if we take advantage of the possibilities it presents for 





readings (A1) and (A3*) individuated in section 4 (reported below for 
convenience). 
  
(A1) One must: assert that p only if p has C 
(A3*) One asserts that p iff in saying p, one is subject to rule (A1) 
 
I have already stressed that the C-rule to which Williamson refers is (A1), not 
(A3). If the C-rule is constitutive of assertion in Pollock’s ‘prescriptive’ sense, 
to claim of (A1) that is constitutive of assertion is to claim that (A3*) is true 
of (A1) 8. Therefore, both (A1) and (A3*) help make sense of what it means for 
assertion to be constituted by a norm: (A1) spells out the content of the norm, 
whereas (A3) postulates that assertion is necessarily subject to that norm (so 
that (A1) is a prescriptive rule of assertion, in Pollock’s sense).  
 
5.2 The problem with Pollock’s distinction 
 
The notion of prescriptive rule captures the sense in which the HYPOTHESIS 
takes the C-rule to be constitutive of assertion: the C-rule is essential to 
assertion (C1*), takes the form of an imperative (R2) and can be violated while 
engaging in the practice (R3)9. However, I will show that, depending on the 
understanding of ‘essential’ that one adopts for (C1*), the notion of prescriptive 
norms either (i) fails to include the C-rule, or (ii) coincides with the orthodox 
notion of regulative rules. 
Williamson (2000:238-9) identifies two ways of conceiving a norm as 
essential to a practice. In a ‘broad’, ordinary sense, we say that a norm is 
essential to a practice if we cannot conceive that practice as not being ruled by 
                                               
8 To be sure: to claim that (A1) is uniquely constitutive of assertion amounts to claiming 
that (A3*) is true of (A1). Constitutivity without uniqueness could only account for 
the left-to-right reading of the biconditional. I am ignoring this distinction in text, for 
ease of discussion. 
9 Hindriks (2007:399), Johnson (2018) and Reiland (2019) all defend an interpretation 
of WILLIAMSON’S HYPOTHESIS along these lines, but proceed to make further and 
different claims. Hindriks goes on to argue that the C-rule (identified as the knowledge 
rule) is not constitutive of assertion in this sense. Johnson rejects part of Pollock’s view: 
she argues that (unlike speech acts like assertion) games like football are only subject 
to definitive rules, never to prescriptive ones (2018:55). However, there are several rules 
that are straightforwardly prescriptive in football, such as the rule against touching the 
ball with your hands (see Marsili 2018:642, cf. also discussion of rule (FKR) in this very 
section). Finally, Reiland (2017:fn9) rejects the idea that there are such things as 





that norm. This conception is quite loose, as it takes essentiality to depend on 
the judgments of a community. For instance, since in our community we say 
that “games such as tennis gradually change their rules over time without losing 
their identity” (2000:239), the rules that change in these games are not essential 
to them. 
By contrast, in a ‘narrow’, technical sense, being essential is a very strict 
modal relation: the rules of a given practice define the identity conditions of 
that practice, so that they necessarily regulate it. Any change in the rules of 
the practice generates a new practice identified necessarily by different rules, 
and in which different moves are allowed. In this technical sense, we say that a 
practice that evolves in time is a different practice at each stage of its evolution. 
The C-rule cannot be taken to be essential to assertion in the broad sense, 
as this conception would not count it as constitutive of assertion (cf. Cappelen 
2011:30). We obviously can conceive assertion as being governed by norms other 
than the C-rule: the very disagreement that animates the philosophical debate 
turns on the conceivability of different specifications of the C-rule: condition C 
could be that p is true, that p is known by the speaker, that the speaker 
rationally believes p, etc. The broad conception of essentiality is thus 
incompatible with the HYPOTHESIS10. 
Consistently, Williamson claims that the C-rule should be taken to be 
constitutive in the narrow sense (2000:239). The problem with this solution is 
that, paired with a ‘prescriptive’ interpretation of constitutive rules, it 
problematically erases the distinction between constitutive and regulative 
norms, counting all norms that impose regulations as constitutive – so that the 
claim that the norm is constitutive boils down to the trivial, uninteresting claim 
that the norm of assertion is a norm. Let us address this issue in more detail. 
In the narrow sense, it seems that not only prescriptive rules, but also all 
the orthodoxly regulative rules are essential to (and hence constitutive of) the 
practices they regulate: every change in a regulative rule slightly alters the 
moves allowed in the practice it regulates, thereby generating a slightly different 
practice. To see this, consider an intuitively marginal rule of football: 
 
                                               
10 One could reply that it is the unspecified C-rule that is essential to assertion, rather 
than any specification of it. But this move is not available, for two reasons. First, it 
would mean giving up the whole project of identifying property C, as no rule in 
particular would be essential to assertion after all. Second, against Williamson’s 
desiderata, an unspecified C-rule would not only regulate assertions, but most speech 
acts (as for most speech acts, the speaker ought to have the psychological state that 
that speech act expresses, e.g. you should intend to p if you promise to p, cf. Searle 




(FKR) If a player kicks a free kick, she must not touch the ball again before 
it is touched by another player 
 
It is easy to imagine variations of football that deny (FKR) and allow, e.g., for 
a second or a third touch after the kick. In the ordinary broad sense, we judge 
such variations as unessential: a game without (FKR) can still be appropriately 
called football, and hence the rule is not essential to the game. However, in the 
technical, narrow sense that matters to the HYPOTHESIS, (FKR) is essential to 
the game. Necessarily, (FKR) governs football: if football was regulated by a 
slightly different rule, football would be a slightly different game (call it 
football*), identified by a slightly different set of rules. 
If even a marginal regulative rule like (FKR) is counted as constitutive to 
football, it is difficult to see how this view could allow for rules that are not 
constitutive. It seems that every rule, independently of how marginal or central 
to a given practice, counts as constitutive on this conception. But if all rules 
are constitutive, claiming that the C-rule is constitutive of assertion is 
redundant – it simply amounts to claiming that that rule governs assertion. 
Pollock (1982:218, cf. also Montminy 2014) attempts to address this worry 
by offering a putative example of a rule that would still count as regulative in 
the proposed framework: in the game of Scrabble11, “do not make unnecessary 
noise when your opponent is thinking about his next move”. Unlike (FKR), this 
rule is not essential to Scrabble in the narrow sense; nonetheless, it regulates it. 
It is a putative example of a regulative, but not constitutive, rule of Scrabble. 
Pollock’s account seems to classify general rules (like rules of etiquette) as 
regulative, and practice-specific rules as constitutive, thus maintaining a 
meaningful distinction between constitutive and regulative rules. 
This explanation, however, overlooks a fundamental fact: while (FKR) is 
clearly a rule of football, the mentioned rule is not in the same sense a rule of 
Scrabble (as a matter of fact, the first is in the rulebook of the game, the second 
is not). Rather than a rule of Scrabble, the rule against disturbing the opponent 
is a general rule or maxim of a higher-order activity (for instance, a rule of fair 
play: “Avoid disrupting your opponent’s play, unless this is explicitly prescribed 
                                               
11  Pollock's original example rather refers to the rules of chess. However, making 
unnecessary noises is explicitly forbidden by rule 11.5 of the FIDE Laws of Chess (as 
of 2018), so that this rule would actually qualify as prescriptive rather than regulative, 
since it is essential to the game of chess in the relevant (narrow) sense (if chess was not 
regulated by rule 11.5, it would be a slightly different game). Since Pollock's point 
seems to be that in playing a game we sometimes follow rules that are not formally 






by the game”) that also constrains, indirectly, which actions are appropriate in 
playing Scrabble (as well as other games, such as checkers, go, etc.). To put it 
in other terms, the normative constraint against disturbing the opponent is not 
generated by the rules of Scrabble, but rather by a higher order norm governing 
fair play. In a similar way, the norm “Do not speak with your mouth full” 
constrains the practice of assertion, but is not a rule of assertion (it also 
constrains questions, bets, praises, etc.). It is a general rule about how to eat 
and talk politely that also applies to the speech act of assertion. 
If this line of reasoning is correct, Pollock’s example fails to show that the 
proposed account allows for some rules that are not constitutive. The 
aforementioned rules are constitutive too, because they are essential (in the 
narrow sense) to the higher-order practices that they regulate, namely ‘fair play’ 
and ‘eating politely’: if these latter practices were regulated by different rules, 
they would be different practices. 
A difficulty thus emerges for the proposed interpretation: for the claim that 
the norm is constitutive to be meaningful, one needs to show that there are 
some rules that are not constitutive. Otherwise, the claim that the norm of 
assertion is constitutive simply boils down to the trivial claim that the norm of 
assertion is a norm. 
 
5.3 Direct vs Indirect constraints 
 
In light of this difficulty, we could try to recast the regulative/constitutive 
distinction as a distinction between constraints that a rule imposes directly (to 
the higher-order practice to which they are essential, e.g. eating politely) and 
the ones it imposes indirectly (to the lower-order practices to which they also 
apply, e.g. assertion), dubbing the former constitutive and the latter regulative. 
In this sense, the constitutive rule of eating politely “Do not speak with your 
mouth full” is also indirectly a regulative rule of asserting. 
On this reading, the distinction survives, but it is reduced to a mere matter 
of scope: all rules are ultimately constitutive, but when they impose constraint 
on a lower-order practice to which they are not essential, this indirect constraint 
can be described as regulative (of the lower-order practice, since it regulates it 
indirectly). This distinction is logically coherent. But there are two important 
considerations that we must keep in mind to fully understand its import. 
First, the revised regulative-constitutive distinction no longer identifies 
different kinds of rules (like it was the case with the orthodox conception), but 
rather different routes that the same kind of rule can take to constrain a given 
activity: a direct route (in Φ-ing, you are subject to the rule for Φ-ing  qua 
participant in practice Φ) or an indirect route (since in Φ-ing you are also X-




X). Thus revised, the constitutive-regulative distinction does not identify 
different species of rules, but rather different ways in which an activity can be 
subject to a rule of the same kind. Read in this light, the hypothesis that the 
norm is constitutive no longer specifies the kind of norm to which assertion is 
subject; it merely specifies in which way assertors are subject to a prescriptive 
norm: qua assertors, rather than qua participants in a higher-order activity. 
Second, this does not seem to be the role that Williamson (or any author 
writing on the norm of assertion) has in mind when he claims that the norm is 
constitutive. Williamson acknowledges that norms of higher-order practices can 
constrain assertions indirectly: “norms such as relevance, good phrasing, and 
politeness are just applications of more general cognitive or social norms to the 
specific act of assertion” (2000:238, cf. also 2000:256), but these remarks are 
independent of the claim that the norm is constitutive. Similarly, other authors 
writing on the norm of assertion generally treat the claim that the norm is 
constitutive and the claim that the norm governs assertion directly as distinct. 
It is standard for authors to claim that the C-rule is constitutive of assertion 
and then add, as an independent claim, that they take assertion to be subject 
to the C-rule ‘qua assertion' (in the proposed terminology, directly, see e.g. 
Rescorla 2009:123, Turri 2011:527, Whiting 2012:849, McKinnon 2013, 
Goldberg 2015:76). 
The most likely explanation for these two observations is that these authors 
(including Williamson) implicitly accept a dichotomy between ‘merely 
regulative’ and ‘prescriptive’ rules – a dichotomy that I have shown to be 
misguided. In other words, they incorrectly assume a difference in kind between 
prescriptive and regulative rules (the former being essential to the act they 
regulate, the latter not being so); and this warrants the further (but equally 
misled) assumption that the distinction is not about different routes taken by 
a norm of the same kind, but rather about different kinds of norms. To put this 
more simply, the significance of the claim that the C-rule is constitutive of 
assertion is not fully understood in the philosophical debate: to claim that the 
C-rule is constitutive of assertion is not to claim something about the kind of 
rule that regulates assertion, but rather something about the route that this 
regulative rule takes to regulate assertion – a direct route, rather than an 
indirect one.  
 
 6. Consequences for the ongoing debate: must do better 
 
This paper has tried to clarify the full import of the claim that the C-rule is 




misunderstandings that pollute the current debate on the norm of assertion. It 
will be helpful to recapitulate them, by considering them in turn. 
First, this paper has established that Williamson’s notion of ‘constitutive 
rule’ is revisionary with respect to standard terminology in speech act theory: 
his notion ‘constitutive rule’ is essentially equivalent to the orthodox conception 
of ‘regulative rule’, where the latter notion is restricted to ‘direct’ regulation. 
The notion of ‘constitutive rule’ adopted in Williamson’s framework is thus 
almost equivalent to its complementary notion in the ‘traditional’ speech-act 
theoretic framework (the notion of regulative rule)12. 
Second, this paper has shown that by redefining the concept in this way, 
Williamson has led many researchers astray. This paper has offered a 
comprehensive review of the misunderstandings that have stemmed from this 
terminological revision: it has shown not only that authors interpret the term 
‘constitutive’ in radically different ways, but also that their interpretations are 
mutually incompatible. The claim here is not that Williamson’s use of the term 
is incorrect or incoherent, but rather that its clash with the terminology that 
was previously prevalent in the literature has caused the HYPOTHESIS to be 
interpreted in different ways by different authors.  
Thirdly, this paper has analysed some prominent interpretations of the 
HYPOTHESIS, discussing the problems encountered by each view. We have seen 
(§4) that some philosophers take it to claim that the C-rule is constitutive of 
assertion in the orthodox sense, or at least in some sense compatible with it. 
These authors (e.g. García-Carpintero 2004:143, 2018:4 Rescorla 2007:253, 
2009:99, Turri 2013:281) are misled because (as shown in §4) there is no reading 
of WILLIAMSON’S HYPOTHESIS that is consistent with the orthodox reading. 
There are also authors who contrast Williamson’s constitutive rules to orthodox 
regulative ones (Pagin 2015: §6.2, García-Carpintero 2004:143, 2018:4,13): these 
authors are similarly misled, as Williamson’s constitutive rules essentially 
belong to the regulative kind.  
Some further (and subtler) misunderstandings stem from the mistaken 
assumption that there are regulative rules that are not constitutive in 
Williamson’s sense (cf. Pollock 1982). Accepting this assumption has led many 
authors to misjudge the significance of the claim that the norm is constitutive. 
It has led them to infer that ‘constitutive’ norms are different in kind from other 
                                               
12 Although I noted in section 5 that charging Williamson with the intention to bring 
about such a radical revision would be uncharitable, it has become clear in §5.3-4 that 
this revisionary result was rather unintended, and due to a mistaken assumption 
common in the literature: namely, that there are regulative rules that are not ‘essential 
to’ the practices that they regulate (in the relevant sense of ‘essential’). Were this 
assumption to be correct, Williamson’s notion of ‘constitutive rule’ would have rather 




norms (merely regulative ones), so that ascribing constitutivity to the C-rule 
was taken to ascribe a special status to it (Hindriks 2007, Ball 2014) – a status 
that the C-rule simply lacks.  
Once one accepts that the C-rule is a ‘constitutive norm’ only in the weak 
sense that it is an orthodoxly regulative norm that regulates assertion directly, 
what are the consequences for the ongoing philosophical discussion? The core 
of WILLIAMSON’S HYPOTHESIS still stands: it is still a plausible assumption that 
(i) assertion is subject to a norm taking the form: “One must: assert that p only 
if p has C” (i.e. that (A1) is true); and that (ii) this norm necessarily regulates 
assertion. Even if we have been forced to retreat to the weaker claim that the 
C-rule regulates assertion directly, this does not mean that we have to follow 
authors, like Cappelen (2011), who deny that asserting is a rule-governed 
activity (although we could, on independent grounds). 
Other key claims and assumptions about the norm of assertion, however, 
lose their strength once we retreat to this weaker claim. The first is the 
uniqueness assumption: the idea that assertion, qua assertion, is governed only 
by the C-rule. This assumption already rested on shaky grounds: it has been 
pointed out that “that there is such a unique rule is little more than an item of 
faith for Williamson, with no justification offered other than that a simple 
account consisting of such a single rule would be ‘theoretically satisfying’” 
(DeRose 2002:fn15), and several authors explicitly argued against this view 
(Brown 2008, Carter 2015, Carter & Gordon 2011, Gerken 2014, McKenna 
2015).  
The plausibility of the uniqueness assumption hinges significantly on 
conceiving the norm as constitutive in orthodox sense, rather than in 
Williamson’s revisionary sense. In the orthodox framework, constitutive norms 
are akin to definitions, so that there is nothing too controversial about claiming 
that a speech act can be defined in terms of its constitutive rules. The situation 
changes when we acknowledge that Williamson’s constitutive rules are 
regulative in the orthodox sense. Speech acts are typically regulated by many 
regulative rules (given that felicitous performance of a speech act can, and often 
does, depend on the satisfaction of several conditions). This is a problem for 
Williamson’s conception. If the C-rule is constitutive in the orthodox sense, its 
uniqueness follows. But if it is not, there is no reason to assume that the C-rule 
is unique. And if there is no reason to assume that assertion is governed by a 
unique rule, it follows that (A3) is unwarranted: 
 
(A3) One asserts that p iff in saying p, one is subject to the obligation 
that p must have C 
 





(A4) One asserts that p only if in saying p, one is subject to the obligation 
that p must have C 
 
Moving from (A3) to (A4) is not an insignificant step. It means abandoning the 
appealing idea that assertion can be defined simply in terms of its norm – that 
is, abandoning the claim that the norm is individuating (Williamson 2000:241, 
cf. also e.g. Goldberg 2015:25, Johnson 2018:52). To be sure, the claim made 
here is not that (A3) must be false; rather, it is that once it is recognized that 
the norm is not constitutive in the orthodox sense, there is no principled reason 
to think that it is uniquely governed by the C-rule, so that we have no warrant 
for preferring (A3) over (A4). 
A further, crucial difficulty concerns the significance and originality of the 
hypothesis thus conceived. Deprived of the claims that the C-rule is 
constitutive, unique and individuating, the HYPOTHESIS is rendered unoriginal 
and therefore of little significance. It cannot be original, because this view has 
already been orthodoxy in speech act theory for 50 years. It is a standard view 
that different speech acts are subject to different epistemic norms, and that 
these norms are analogous to the C-rule in form, i.e. that they are orthodoxly 
regulative rules (Searle 1969, Searle & Vanderveken 1985, Alston 2000).  
In conclusion, this paper has accomplished three important results. First, 
it has dispelled some significant confusion surrounding WILLIAMSON’S 
HYPOTHESIS, clarifying the full import of the claim that the norm of assertion 
is constitutive. Second, it has established that the alleged dichotomy between 
prescriptive and merely regulative rules (recast by Williamson as a dichotomy 
between ‘constitutive’ and merely regulative rules) is misguided: it is not a 
distinction between kinds of rules, and it rather denotes two ways in which the 
same kind of rule can regulate an given practice (direct and indirect regulation). 
Third, it has reviewed a number of crucial misunderstandings that affect many 
extant accounts of assertion, raising a substantial challenge for them: namely, 
that there is no reason to assume that assertion is governed by a single 
constitutive norm, and that assertion can be identified as the only speech act 
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